Case 20-12816-JKS Doc 503 Filed 09/17/21 Page 1 of 52

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

. Chapter 11

IN RE:

. Case No. 20-12816(JKS)

FURNITURE FACTORY ULTIMATE HOLDING, L.P., et al,

. 824 Market Street

. Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Debtors. .

. Thursday, September 16, 2021

TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO HEARING RE:
FIRST AMENDED JOINT PLAN OF LIQUIDATION
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. KATE STICKLES
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRUSTEE

For the Official Committee

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U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT

INDEX

	<u>Page</u>
PRESENTMENT/ARGUMENT BY MR. PACITTI	8
ARGUMENT BY MS. LOTEMPIO	23
ARGUMENT BY MR. HACKMAN	27
STIPULATIONS	36
FURTHER ARGUMENT	37
COURT DECISION	46

<u>EXHIBIT</u>	EVID.
Roach Declaration	12
Tsai Declaration	12

(Proceedings commence at 10:00 a.m.)

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and the hearing is about to begin. Please remember to state your name for the record when you speak and every time you speak. Please keep your video off and stay muted if you're not speaking to the Judge, so that the Judge can concentrate on the parties that are presenting at the time. Thank you.

THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge Stickles. We're on the record in Furniture Factory Ultimate Holding, Case Number 20-12816.

This is a hearing on confirmation --

MR. PACITTI: Judge, if you're speaking, I can't hear you. I don't know if the Judge ... Katherine, can you hear me?

THE COURT: Can you hear me now?

MR. PACITTI: Can you hear the Judge?

THE COURT: I can hear you. Mr. Pacitti, can you hear me now? No.

(Court and court personnel confer)

THE COURT: Can you hear me now?

MR. PACITTI: I can, yes, I can.

THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you for interrupting me.

MR. PACITTI: It's all right.

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. This is Judge

Stickles. We're on the record in Furniture Factory Ultimate Holdings, Case Number 20-12816. This is the hearing on confirmation of the debtors' first amended joint plan of liquidation.

I'll turn the podium over to debtors' counsel, please.

MR. PACITTI: Thank you, Your Honor. For the record, Domenic Pacitti and Michael Yurkewicz, who I believe is on by phone, of Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg, on behalf of the debtors. And --

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Pacitti.

MR. PACITTI: Good morning, Your Honor. Good to see you again.

Your Honor, as you said, we are here on one matter that's on our agenda that we filed at Docket 497, and that's confirmation of our first amended joint plan of liquidation.

Your Honor, as we always do, we've tried to resolve as many issues that have been raised as possible in advance of today's hearing. And to that end, we actually have reached resolution with a number of folks, and they were the informal objections of the Comptroller of Public Accounts and the filed objection of the Texas taxing authorities, and we resolved that through language that was inserted in the proposed confirmation order that was filed at Docket 490, and that's at Paragraphs 84 and 85, respectively,.

We'd like to thank Mr. Hackman at the outset because we've been going through this case with him and dealing with a lot of issues behind the scenes, and he's worked, as he always does, with us hand in hand, to try to resolve issues and limit things that we might need to bring to the Court for determination, and this case was no different than our experience with Mr. Hackman. So we really appreciate all the effort he's put into these cases throughout, including at the disclosure statement hearing and leading up to plan confirmation.

And in that vein, we continued to try to narrow, as best we could, those issues with the United States Trustee, and we have made some progress and resolved several issues.

And in fact, Your Honor, we resolved another one literally minutes before we all joined on the Zoom call today.

We did insert in Paragraph 86 of the proposed confirmation order additional language that resolves various issues with Mr. Hackman, and they relate -- and we'll address it later -- but they specifically relate to a couple of matters. And there's one other or two other additions that we'll make to the confirmation order that we'll address later.

But what I think we're down to is, effectively, the third-party release, whether it's consensual is appropriate or not, and the exculpation provisions, in terms of the time

period covered, and I quess the interplay with a provision in the trust agreement as it relates to that. But I think the others have been resolved, Your Honor, so at least that's good news.

THE COURT: Thank you. And I appreciate the parties working together. I realize it takes a lot of effort, and I'm glad there's a good line of communication and you've worked to resolve matters.

MR. PACITTI: Thank you, Your Honor. We keep trying to do that.

So, Your Honor, if it pleases the Court, I would propose to proceed as follows: Perhaps just do like a brief overview of the plan and the BS process and how we got to leading up to today, moving on to the evidentiary record in support of confirmation, and then address the remaining objections of Mr. Hackman, and then turn it over to folks who may want to speak in favor of the plan. And then I'm sure Mr. Hackman would like to address his objections. And I'm just wondering: Is that an acceptable approach to Your Honor?

THE COURT: Certainly.

MR. PACITTI: Does that make sense.

THE COURT: That makes --

MR. PACITTI: Great.

THE COURT: -- perfect sense.

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MR. PACITTI: Awesome.

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So, Your Honor, back on June 3rd of 2021, after working closely with the committee's counsel Mr. Gayda and Ms. LoTempio, Mr. Samis and Ms. Good, the debtors filed their joint Chapter 11 plan of liquidation, which was at Docket 375. We also filed the disclosure statement with respect to that plan at Docket 376. And we filed our disclosure statement and solicitation procedures motion at Docket 377.

After they were filed, as Mr. Hackman always does, he gives -- he sends us an email with his thoughts and his comments, and we tried to work through all of those and continued discussions with the committee and up until July 20th of 2021, where we made various changes to the plan, the disclosure statement, the disclosure statement order, and the exhibits attached to that order with respect to the solicitation packages.

And we filed, on July 20th, our first amended joint Chapter 11 plan at Docket 412, the disclosure statement with respect to that plan at Docket 414, redlines with respect to each of those at Dockets 413 and 415 respectively. And we filed a notice of a proposed revised order with revised exhibits with respect to approval of the disclosure statement and the solicitation materials.

Your Honor, on July 23rd, we were in front of Your Honor for the disclosure statement hearing. And afterwards,

Your Honor entered an order approving the disclosure statement at Docket 425. If Your Honor recalls, it contained further changes that Your Honor requested with respect to the various notices and ballots and the like.

Consistent with that order, Your Honor, on July 28th, the debtors filed the solicitation version of the plan at Docket 430, the solicitation version of the disclosure statement at Docket 431, and we filed the confirmation hearing notice at Docket 433.

Your Honor, those solicitation materials were served by Stretto, consistent with the disclosure statement approval order, as reflected in Stretto's affidavit of service regarding those solicitation packages. It was filed on August 4th at Docket 453.

Additionally, Your Honor, the debtors published the confirmation hearing notice in the New York Times National Edition on July 30th, in compliance with the disclosure statement order and Bankruptcy Rule 2002. And that's evidenced by the affidavit of publication that was filed on August 2nd, at Docket 446.

Additionally, Your Honor, and in further compliance with the disclosure statement order, on August 31st of 2021, the debtors filed and served a notice of plan supplement at Docket 481. That notice contained a copy of the liquidating trust agreement and declaration of trust as Exhibit A, the

identification of the liquidating trustee as Exhibit B, and the identification of the liquidation trust advisory board members as Exhibit B. Those pleadings also set forth the proposed compensation for the plan -- the liquidating trustee, as well.

Your Honor, the voting deadline in this case was September 8th of 2021. And as reflected in the declaration of Angela Tsai from Stretto that was filed at Docket 488 on September 13, 2021, there were four classes that could vote on the plan.

Classes 4, 5, and 6 did not vote on the plan and did not otherwise object to the plan.

Class 7, which is our general unsecured claim class, voted overwhelmingly in favor of the plan. It was 95 percent of those who voted, voted in favor, in terms of number of votes; and 99.82 percent of folks, in terms of the amount of claims, voted in favor of the plan.

Your Honor, in support of plan confirmation, on September 13th, the debtors also filed the declaration of Donald V. Roach, who is the debtors' COO and CFO, in support of confirmation at Docket 489.

We also filed our memorandum of law in support of confirmation at Docket 491 and we filed a notice of proposed confirmation order at Docket 490.

Your Honor, briefly, the plan is effectively the

continuation of the wind down of the debtors' business and its affairs and the continued liquidation of the remaining assets of the debtor.

The plan provides that a plan liquidating trustee will be appointed, as selected by the committee; that that liquidating trustee will:

Receive the "liquidation trust assets," as defined in the plan;

Establish operating and claims reserves, as are necessary to carry out the terms of the plan;

Perform claims reconciliation process;

Prosecute or settle or abandon any of the retained causes of action;

And then, ultimately, calculate and make distributions under the plan.

And that's sort of a brief overview of what we've put forth before the Court today.

Your Honor, in terms of the evidentiary record -- and I did ask Mr. Hackman if he would agree, and he did agree that he would -- that we could move into evidence, in terms of the direct case, the voting declaration of Ms. Tsai, who's here on the Zoom call today, at Docket 488, and the declaration of Mr. Roach that was filed at Docket 489, and Mr. Roach is on the call, as well, today. So we would move those into evidence.

THE COURT: Let me ask. Could Ms. Tsai and Mr. 1 2 Roach make themselves available on Zoom? I see you're both 3 on Zoom. Does anyone objection to the admission of the Roach 4 5 declaration at Docket Number 489 or the Tsai declaration at Docket 488 for purposes of the debtors' case-in-chief in 6 7 connection with confirmation of the plan today? 8 (No verbal response) 9 THE COURT: I hear none. The declaration is 10 admitted. (Roach Declaration received in evidence) 11 12 (Tsai Declaration received in evidence) 13 THE COURT: Is there any party participating today 14 that expects to cross-examine Mr. Roach or Ms. Tsai regarding 15 the content of their declarations? Okay. Hearing none, the 16 deck --17 MR. HACKMAN: Your Honor, this is Ben Hackman. 18 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Hackman. 19 MR. HACKMAN: I'm sorry, Your Honor. May it please 20 the Court. 21 THE COURT: Good morning. 22 MR. HACKMAN: I would like to cross-examine Ms. 2.3 Tsai and Mr. Roach briefly --24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. HACKMAN: -- if I may --

THE COURT: Okay. 1 2 MR. HACKMAN: -- at the appropriate time. 3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 4 Mr. Pacitti. 5 MR. PACITTI: Sure. Your Honor, we would also, I 6 quess, move into evidence or ask Your Honor to take judicial 7 notice of the affidavits of service with respect to solicitation at Docket 453, the affidavit of publication at 8 9 Docket 446, and the plan supplement filing at Docket 481. 10 THE COURT: So noted. 11 MR. PACITTI: Your Honor, I guess, given that Mr. 12 Hackman would like to cross-examine, I was going to get into 13 sort of just the general requirements of confirmation and 14 address his objections. I didn't know if you wanted to hear 15 the cross-examination first, or would you like us to proceed through the argument and address any objections first? 16 17 THE COURT: Could we -- could I hear the argument 18 first? 19 MR. PACITTI: Sure. 20 THE COURT: And then Mr. Hackman, in the context of 21 the argument, would you like to cross-examine Ms. Tsai and 22 Mr. Roach? Does that work for you? 23 MR. HACKMAN: Whatever pleases the Court, Your 24 Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKMAN: I'm happy to proceed however you would like. Thank you.

THE COURT: Let's hear argument first.

MR. PACITTI: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, as I mentioned previously, the proposed confirmation order reflects the resolutions with various of the objecting parties, including most of the objections of Mr. Hackman. And we believe that we have satisfied the provisions of Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code by a preponderance of the evidence. We believe that the plan complies with the relevant provisions of the Code and the Rules and non-bankruptcy law. And as set forth in our memorandum and in Mr. Roach's declaration, the plan fully complies with the requirements of Sections 1122, 1123, and 1129.

And Your Honor, I know we have argument to make, so, rather than reciting all of the sort of nuts-and-bolts plan confirmation requirements, we'll just rely on our memorandum of law, the record, and Mr. Roach's declaration and Ms. Tsai's declaration, and we'll address the remaining objections of Mr. Hackman, if that's okay.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. PACITTI: So, Your Honor, with respect to the language that resolves the remaining objections, Paragraph 86, what we have agreed with Mr. Hackman is that we would

include an additional provision that says, pursuant to Section 1141(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, neither the plan or this order shall be deemed to provide the debtors a discharge. That was one of the objections that Mr. Hackman raised in the context of Article (ix)(A), which was the 9019 settlement feature of the plan, which the language already addresses.

Additionally, the language at -- the filed provision at Paragraph 86 provides that any persons or entities that are set forth on the voting declaration at Exhibit B who packages were undeliverable would not be deemed a releasing party, and that seemed appropriate, Your Honor. We're certainly not seeking to impose a consensual release on folks who didn't get notice. So it's -- those folks are carved out of that release.

THE COURT: And that is what was in your confirmation brief.

MR. PACITTI: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PACITTI: And then the additional language that we agreed to, leading right up to the hearing, is, I guess with -- it goes to sort of the objection regarding the scope of the release. And that's specifically at Section -- or Article (ix)(D)(2) of the plan. We, along with the committee, have agreed to remove -- or put in the

confirmation order that the language will be removed that: 1 2 "-- upon any other act or omission, transaction, 3 agreement, event, or other occurrence taking place on or before the effective date." 4 5 That language appears at like -- I think it's --6 one, two, three -- perhaps the third line up at the bottom of 7 that paragraph, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. PACITTI: Mr. Hackman was concerned that that 10 seemed to be over-broad and perhaps go beyond what the scope of the release provided above. So we're happy to take out 11 12 that language, and I think that that would resolve his 13 objection, as it relates to the scope of the release. 14 THE COURT: Could you read that language to me one 15 more time, please? 16 MR. PACITTI: Sure, Your Honor. I'm working off of 17 my cribbed notes. I don't have the actual page of --18 THE COURT: That's all --19 MR. PACITTI: -- the -- where the --20 THE COURT: I under -- I found the section. I just 21 need to you to read me the language again. 22 MR. PACITTI: Yeah. It's -- it begins, I think 23 it's the fourth or fifth line up. 24 "-- upon any other act or omission, transaction, 25 agreement, event, or other occurrence taking place

on or before the effective date."

It's that language --

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. PACITTI: -- that we will strike from the release provision.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PACITTI: Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PACITTI: You're welcome, Your Honor.

So, Your Honor, I think what that does is it leaves us with, as I said, the two remaining issues.

And with respect to the third-party release provisions and whether they're consensual or not, first of all, Your Honor, we're not seeking non-consensual releases; rather, we believe that the structure of the plan, the solicitation procedures, the various notices and ballots approved at the disclosure statement hearing are all sufficient to establish that the third-party releases here are, in fact, consensual releases. And as we've set forth in our response to the objections in our brief, there is ample authority from courts in this district that provide that consent itself, and not affirmative consent, is an appropriate standard for consensual third-party releases.

Now, Your Honor, we're mindful of the holdings in Washington Mutual and in the Emerge case. But what we do is,

instead, we argue that those decisions, number one, are controlling on each of the judges in our district; and that, likewise, there's ample authority in this district with other courts in this district that follow Indianapolis Downs and acknowledge that, when you have a process that allows you to check a box to opt out of a release or otherwise provide for an objection mechanisms for objecting to a third-party release, that it's permissible, so long as those methods are conspicuous and set forth in the various notices and ballots. And we cite to those cases in our brief, Your Honor, and I won't go through each of them.

I do want to note that, however, recently, Judge Goldblatt addressed these issues in the Alex and Ani case, albeit at the disclosure statement stage of the case. But he stated, in ruling on the disclosure statement and the approval of the appropriateness of the opt-out provisions that he was persuaded, as a general proposition, that parties-in-interest in a bankruptcy case are affected by what happens in a plan, and that they -- and if they have a problem with what's happening to them under the plan, it's incumbent on them to say so; and that, so long as disclosure is sufficiently obvious and conspicuous and that the third party has the opportunity to opt out, it's appropriate to treat the failure to do so as evidence of consent.

He also indicated, Your Honor, that approving a

disclosure statement that has all of these features -- and certainly, it was at that stage that he was making this determination, and then later confirming a plan -- or not confirming a plan that went down that road of opt-out provisions. In his mind, it was just -- and I'll see how he phrased it is "it's a strange way to run a railroad," is what he said.

And we agree with him today here, Your Honor. Your Honor, here, each of the notices of the confirmation hearing — which was a matrix mailing — each of the ballots, each of the nonvoting notices contained conspicuous language about the releases, contained specific conspicuous direction about opting out and what would happen if you did not opt out or otherwise object to the release. And in fact, Your Honor asked for additional disclosure, which we were happy to do, and we made those changes in the various notices and ballots.

More importantly, Your Honor, the process actually worked here. As Exhibit B of the voting declaration sets forth, of the 81 ballots cast on -- in the solicitation process, 18 of those ballots chose to opt out of the release. And in fact, one ballot that was returned, the party chose to abstain from voting either for or against the plan, but nevertheless opted out of the release.

So, Your Honor, we really believe that, because of the clear and conspicuous language in the various notices and

ballots, the evidence that the process actually worked and parties, in fact, opted out of releases, that we provided that folks who did not get notice by undeliverable solicitation packages not being bound by virtue of the revised language in the order, we believe that the third-party releases are, in fact, consensual, and that Your Honor should follow Judge Shannon's Indianapolis Downs case and the other cases that follow his direction in this district and overrule the U.S. Trustee's objections and approve the third-party releases as consensual releases.

With respect to the exculpation time period, Your Honor, the plan's exculpation provision does arguably contemplate some prospective terms because the definition of "exculpated claim" in the plan includes any claim arising after the petition date and on or before the closing of the Chapter 11 cases. Mr. Hackman believes that this should just stop as of the effective date of the plan.

Number one, we think, first of all, that this type of a -- if you want to even call it "prospective" type of exculpation is entirely permissible under the facts here and under the case law. Like on a practical level, Your Honor, the prospective exculpation creates a positive incentive, right? For fiduciaries to carry out and implement a plan and, particularly here, a liquidating plan, where this is not a reorg where, you know, we go effective and we close the

case in a week and there's a reorg entity outside of the bankruptcy operating its business and not dealing with anything anymore to do with the Bankruptcy Court. This is a different animal, right? This is a liquidating plan. And notwithstanding that there is an effective date, there is still more to do in this case.

So the trustee obviously points out correctly that the exculpation should be limited to estate fiduciaries that served during the Chapter 11 proceedings. We're not arguing with that, Your Honor. What we're saying is that, number one, the Chapter 11 proceedings aren't finished as of the effective date. The exculpation here actually is limited to those parameters. the exculpated parties here are the debtors, the committee, the members of the committee, solely in their capacities as such, and the liquidating trustee.

The real disagreement here lies that -- where the
is that the debtors contend that the facts are that the

Chapter 11 proceedings simply don't stop on the effective

date. The liquidating trustee is an estate fiduciary. Under

the plan, he's taking over the role of the debtors post
effective-date to continue the wind down of the affairs of

the debtor, to continue to liquidate the remaining assets, to

bring causes of action, to file tax returns, to reconcile

claims, and to ultimately make distributions under the plan.

All of those functions are core to what a Chapter 11

proceeding is, Your Honor. So I don't think just arbitrarily
-- sorry, sorry -- picking the effective date in the context
of these cases makes sense, in terms of what the scope of the
exculpation provision should cover.

Further, Your Honor, there's courts in this district that often confirm plans with similar provisions.

And we cite the SFP case, the Orexigen case, and the Relay Company case in our brief, and we will rely on those.

So, Your Honor, we believe that, because the exculpation is limited to the estate fiduciaries that covers a time period, albeit post-effective-date, but a period that encompasses the Chapter 11 proceedings and the functions of the Chapter 11 proceedings, that Your Honor should overrule the U.S. Trustee's objections and approve the exculpation provisions of the plan.

Your Honor, that's all I have, in terms of argument. I didn't know if anyone else wanted to speak up in favor of the plan, but ...

THE COURT: Yeah, let me hear from anyone who wants to speak in favor of the plan, and then I would like to hear from Mr. Hackman.

MS. LOTEMPIO: Good morning, Your Honor. Catherine LoTempio, Seward & Kissel, on behalf of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. LOTEMPIO: Good morning.

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First, the committee just wanted to express our thanks to the parties involved in this case, including all of the professionals, the Office of the United States Trustee, and Your Honor. With the hard work of everyone involved, we are pleased to be here today presenting a mostly consensual plan, with only a few minor open points that Mr. Pacitti addressed.

And the committee is in agreement with the debtors that the plan is in the best interests of the estate and should be confirmed today. The plan really is a culmination of the successful sale of the debtors' assets to American Freight and an implementation of a settlement as part of that sale that provided the debtors cash to remain in the estates, which now permits us to fund a liquidation trust.

So, as the U.S. Trustee pointed out, the amount to be distributed to unsecured creditors today remains uncertain. But the U.S. Trustee focused only on the lower end of possible distributions. And with the liquidation trust in place, the liquidation trustee will be in -- well positioned to pursue the retained causes of action that have been preserved for the benefit of the states, which, if successful, could provide a meaningful distribution to creditors. This was something that was not a certain possibility on the petition date.

So I know Mr. Pacitti addressed the U.S. Trustee's objections, and I'll briefly just address them, as well, and try not to repeat too much of what Mr. Pacitti said. We also — the committee also joins in the arguments of the debtors.

So, briefly, with respect to the U.S. Trustee's objection to the consensual third-party releases, the -- here, we just agree with Mr. Pacitti's observation that all creditors receiving ballots were made aware of their ability to opt out of the releases and the consequences for not returning the ballot.

The opt-out nature of the ballots was approved in connection with the disclosure statement, and creditors could also file an objection to the plan, in order to not be a releasing party under the plan. And as Mr. Pacitti noted, I mean, the opt-out function of the releases did work in this case and we did have creditors opting out.

So we respectfully submit that the creditors who are properly (indiscernible) of their rights and did not opt out of the releases should be held to have consented to the releases and ask that Your Honor overrule the United States Trustee's objection and approve the third-party releases.

With respect to the temporal scope of the exculpation clause, we would also note that the exculpation clause is limited to estate fiduciaries acting in their fiduciary capacity; has a carveout for fraud, wilful

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misconduct, and gross negligence. And I think the debtors explained this in their confirmation brief, but an exculpation clause is sort of separate and distinct from a release of liability, which does have a temporal (indiscernible)

Instead, an exculpation clause sets a standard for liability that applies to estate fiduciaries in the context of the entire Chapter 11 case. And courts in this district have routinely approved exculpation clauses that are limited to estate fiduciaries in Chapter 11 (indiscernible) posteffective-date. And I think the debtors have cited to some of those cases in their confirmation brief.

And then Mr. Pacitti also noted that these Chapter 11 cases don't end with the effective date. So, here, the plan provides for claims administration, distribution, pursuit of causes of action, all to occur post-effectivedate. And we believe the exculpation clause should function to equally apply the same standard of liability for estate fiduciaries who are acting within the scope of their duties during the entirety of the Chapter 11 proceedings.

THE COURT: What is the anticipated effective date in this case?

MS. LOTEMPIO: I'll defer to Mr. Pacitti on that.

MR. PACITTI: I think we were contemplating the end of the month, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MS. LOTEMPIO: Yeah. And just lastly, I think more to the point here is that we believe the U.S. Trustee's concerns with the temporal scope of the exculpation clause are really, truly resolved by the actual language contained in the provision, which is really only limited to post-effective-date actions that are necessary for the implementation and administration of the plan. So exculpated parties here are not getting exculpation indefinitely for all actions, but instead, the time period for which they performed their duties and obligations under the plan. And I would just note that limiting the scope of the exculpation to pre-effective-date actions would render meaningless these administrative and implementation clauses contained in the exculpation clause.

And I think Mr. Pacitti mentioned, but -- this, but when faced with a similar objection from the U.S. Trustee in the SFP Franchise case, Judge Dorsey agreed that an exculpation clause was properly limited where it applied only to those actions of a fiduciary in connection with the implementation and execution of a plan after the effective date. So we respectfully submit that this is the correct interpretation of the exculpation clause and ask Your Honor to overrule the United States Trustee's objection on this point.

This is all I have, unless Your Honor has any 1 2 questions. 3 THE COURT: I do not. 4 Does anyone else wish to be heard in support of the 5 plan? 6 (No verbal response) 7 THE COURT: Hearing none, I'd like to hear from Mr. 8 Hackman, I'd like to hear from the U.S. Trustee regarding 9 their objection. Good morning, Mr. Hackman. 10 MR. HACKMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Can Your 11 Honor hear me okay? 12 THE COURT: Yes, I can. 13 MR. HACKMAN: Thank you. I'd like to start by thanking counsel for working 14 15 with us to resolve parts of the objection that we filed to 16 confirmation. The -- as counsel indicated, the two sort of 17 broad open issues at this point for us are the third-party 18 releases and the exculpation. 19 We submit that the third-party releases should not imposed on general unsecured creditors in Class 7 who did not 20 21 return a ballot. As I read the numbers from Stretto, the 22 solicitation package was sent to about 557 general unsecured

creditors in Class 7; 81 of them voted, 51 packages were

are agreeing that those 51 creditors whose solicitation

undeliverable. And the debtors, as Mr. Pacitti mentioned,

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packages were undeliverable will not be releasing parties.

But even after subtracting out those 51 members of Class 7, about 84 percent in amounts -- in numb -- I'm sorry -- 84 percent in number and 67 percent in amount of Class 7 creditors did not return a ballot. But the debtors want to impose third-party releases on those creditors in virtue of the fact that they took no action.

Inaction is not consent. Judge Walrath indicated that in Washington Mutual, Judge Owens indicated it in Emerge Energy Services, and the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York indicated that in the Chassix and SunEdison cases. Although, as counsel pointed out, there are cases that reach a different conclusion, such as Indianapolis Downs. If I have my dates right, Indianapolis Downs precedes Emerge Energy, Chassix, and SunEdison.

We submit that carelessness, inattentiveness,
mistake, or even problems with mail delivery are alternatives
-- alternate explanations for why creditors may not have
returned ballots. And carelessness or inattentiveness may
exist here because this case is so thin.

The debtors' assets were significantly undersecured. American Freight FFO bought the debtors' assets for a purchase price that did not really come close to paying off the first lien debt. I understand that American Freight FFO is waiving its deficiency claim. But even after that, the

debtors will need to significantly reduce their 503(b)(9) claims pool. And I understand the committee intends to object to Class 5 and Class 6 claims as part of a strategy for getting a distribution to unsecured creditors in Class 7.

As we sit here today, as I read Mr. Roach's confirmation declaration, Paragraph 35 would suggest that it's possible some administrative claimants may need to take a haircut.

In the SunEdison case, the New York Bankruptcy

Court held that creditors who were eligible to vote, but did

not vote, had not consented to the third-party releases. The

Court wrote that inaction may have been explained by what was

described as the plan's, quote, "meager recovery," for which

unsecured creditors was less than three percent. And that's

576 B.R. at Page 461.

In this case, 3 percent is the high-end projection for unsecured creditors. The low-end projection is two-hundredths of 1 percent. That's not a penny on the dollar; that's a penny on \$50. Class 7, as a whole, is projected as being owed about \$30 million in the disclosure statement. If they get a .02 percent distribution, they would be sharing pro rata in about \$6,000.

THE COURT: But Mr. Hackman --

MR. HACKMAN: The plan --

THE COURT: -- you would agree --

MR. HACKMAN: -- also says that --

THE COURT: -- I don't need to get to that point if these releases are consensual.

MR. HACKMAN: Well, Your Honor, we submit that the debtors have not shown that they're consensual. We submit that simply not taking action is not a manifestation of consent to the releases. And we submit that, because the recoveries, the projected recoveries in this case are so uncertain and so small, that that could lead to indifference or inaction by creditors in determining not to return a ballot.

The other point I would make is the plan's distribute -- the plan's de minimis distribution threshold is \$50. And if the distribution tends towards the low end at .02 percent, and if my math is right, any Class 7 creditor owed less than \$250,000 would not get a recovery under the plan because their distribution would fall under the de minimis threshold. The only -- it's possible that only the largest unsecured creditors would receive a distribution under this plan.

Mr. Pacitti referenced the Alex and Ani decision -bench ruling I gather -- from Judge Goldblatt. I would note
that that transcript appears to have been at a hearing held
on August 20th. This disclosure statement was approved a
month before that, on July 23rd. And our office had given

plan and disclosure statement comments to debtors' counsel a month before that, on June 24th, and we raised the third-party release concern with counsel then. So, for counsel to cite a hearing transcript that was two months after we had given our comments and almost a month after Your Honor had already approved the disclosure statement and solicitation procedures, to say that the U.S. Trustee should have raised the consent issue then, we think is not fair.

I would also observe that Washington Mutual and Emerge Energy are confirmation decisions, not disclosure statement decisions.

And we submit that, for those reasons, general unsecured creditors who have not returned a ballot should not be deemed to consent to the third-party releases.

We also submit that the releases are non-consensual as to the debtors' current and former employees. The debtors closed more than half of their stores pre-petition. And as I read Paragraph 4 of Mr. Roach's confirmation declaration, the debtors had 270 employees on the petition date. Pre-petition, that number was 675 employees. And by the way Article 1(b), an in bravo, (87) is worded, at Part (f), all of the debtors' current and former employees would be releasing parties. We're not aware of a showing that those former employees got notice or had a chance to opt out or that they're getting consideration for having releases

imposed on them. And the same thing, we would submit, goes for current employees. So we submit employee third-party releases are non-consensual, as well.

We don't believe those releases satisfy

Continental, we don't believe they satisfy fairness, the

fairness hallmark, because releasing creditors will not seek

consideration for being subjected to the release. And they

may not get any distribution under the plan at all. It

doesn't appear to us that the majority of the release parties

have provided consideration to receive a release.

The necessity hallmark is absent, we submit, because the releases are not needed for the debtors to reorganize. The debtors are liquidating and releases are not needed for the debtors to finish their wind down and have their remaining assets monetized and distributed to creditors.

We would also -- we also believe that there are no extraordinary circumstances here to distinguish this case from any other Section 363 sale case.

So, for these reasons, we do not believe that the releases satisfy the Third Circuit exacting jurisprudence on non-consensual third-party releases. Third-party releases should not be imposed on general unsecured creditors who did not return a ballot, should not be imposed on employees.

As to exculpation, as counsel indicated, the plan

defines "exculpated claim" to mean acts and omissions relating to the Chapter 11 cases and arising after the petition date and on or before the closing of the Chapter 11 cases. And as we interpret that, the plan would exculpate the exculpated parties for their post-effective-date acts and omissions prospectively. And as I read the liquidation trust agreement, the trust could exit up to five years post-effective-date.

No other estate fiduciary receives exculpation in advance. And some of those fiduciaries, such as the debtors' professionals and the committee's professionals, are subject to strict Rule 2014 disclosures and court oversight during the administration of the case, whereas the liquidation trust and trustee and its professionals will be subject to significantly less court oversight post-effective-date.

If parties want to seek exculpation at the end of the case, for example, in connection with a motion for a final decree, they have the right to seek that. But we subject that prospective exculpation in advance, potentially years in advance, depending on how long the trust operates, is not appropriate.

We also object to Section 7.2 of the liquidation trust agreement, which is filed at Docket Item 481, and is incorporated into the plan. Section 7.2 adopts the exculpation provisions in the plan, but it also provides:

"In no event shall the trust, trustee, or liquidation trust advisory board be liable for indirect, punitive, special, incidental, or consequential damage or loss, including, but not limited to lost profits, whatsoever, even if the trustee has been informed of the likelihood of such loss or damages and regardless of the form of action."

That provision should be stricken.

Back in, I believe it was the late '90s, in the Daily International decision, Judge Walsh found that such a provision was not a reasonable term of employment for estate professionals, who, again, are subject to significantly more court oversight during the case. We're also concerned that that provision erodes the exceptions built into exculpation for wilful misconduct and gross negligence. There is no reason to give that immunity to a liquidation trustee or trust and to give that immunity in advance.

The committee suggested that exculpation is not a release. We disagree with that. Exculpation is a release. A type of release, if you look at the plan, Article 9(c), the language the plan uses says each exculpated party, quote, "is released and exculpated from any exculpated claim." So the plan itself uses "release" language in the exculpation provision.

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So, to conclude, Your Honor, we submit that thirdparty releases should not be imposed on general unsecured
creditors who did not return a ballot and it should not be
imposed on the debtors' employees. We submit that
exculpation in the plan and the liquidation trust agreement
should not extend prospectively past the effective date. And
also, the waiver of all indirect, punitive, incidental, or
consequential damages whatsoever should be removed from the
liquidation trust agreement. And unless the debtors agree to
those changes, we respectfully submit the Court should deny
confirmation.

Unless Your Honor has any questions, that's all I have.

THE COURT: I do not. But Mr. Hackman, you indicated that you wanted to cross-examine Ms. Tsai and Mr. Roach.

MR. HACKMAN: Yes, Your Honor. I wanted to cross-examine Ms. Tsai to confirm that the solicitation materials were sent to approximately 557 general unsecured creditors in Class 7. And I wanted to cross-examine Mr. Roach about the holder of the claims in Class 5 and Class 6 --

THE COURT: Okay. Well --

MR. HACKMAN: -- which is an entity --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I don't want to cut you off. But if you want to cross-examine them, I would like to

have them sworn in and you actually cross-examine them.

MR. PACITTI: Your Honor, if I may just interject.

Mr. Hackman and I talked a little bit yesterday about

stipulation to certain facts, and we can certainly stipulate

about what he just argued, and that is the numbers of ballots

that went out to Class 7 as being 557, and the numbers

returned are already on the declaration. And the percentage

of ballot -- net ballots voted is 16.01 percent.

I think that's what you wanted to stipulate to, Mr. Hackman. If I'm misstating or if I missed something, I'm happy to stipulate that that's the facts.

MR. HACKMAN: That -- this is Ben Hackman for the U.S. Trustee. And with that, I don't need to cross-examine Ms. Tsai.

THE COURT: Okay. And what about Mr. Roach?

MR. PACITTI: Your Honor, if I may address that.

In terms of the proposed cross-examination of Mr. Roach, I don't know that there's any objection by the U.S. Trustee as it relates to Classes 4, 5, or 6 in any way, so I don't know what the relevance of that cross-examination would be, but I just wanted to throw that out.

THE COURT: Okay. I didn't hear the end of Mr. Roach's [sic] comment, initially, as to what he wanted to cross-examine Mr. Roach about, so ...

MR. HACKMAN: That -- this is Ben Hackman for the

U.S. Trustee.

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My understanding -- I'd like to try to clarify the record. My understanding is that an entity called "Furniture Factory Note Holding, LLC" is the administrative agent for the second lien debt in Class 5 and also holds the grid note claims in Class 6. And my understanding is they're connected to Sun Capital Partners, of which the debtor did the portfolio of -- the company is Sun Capital Partners affiliates, just to make -- in case it wasn't clear, you know, in case the Court had questions about why Class 5 and Class 6 did not return a ballot.

MR. PACITTI: Your Honor, I don't know why that's relevant, but we can stipulate that that's correct.

THE COURT: Thank you. Does that --

MR. HACKMAN: And Your Honor, I --

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Hackman.

MR. HACKMAN: Yes, Your Honor. I -- I'm sorry. No need to cross-examine Mr. Roach.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKMAN: Thank you, Mr. Pacitti.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PACITTI: You're welcome.

Your Honor, can I just address a couple of things that Mr. Hackman said? Because I think he may have misunderstood one of my arguments, and I want to apologize

profusely, if I could --

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THE COURT: Yes --

MR. PACITTI: -- but --

THE COURT: -- please.

MR. PACITTI: When I was talking about Judge
Goldblatt's decision in Alex and Ani, I, in no way, meant to
implicate or insinuate in any way that Mr. Hackman should
have raised this or we should have done this at the
disclosure statement hearing. I was really just pointing out
that that's another judge in our district that appears to be
on the side of the Indianapolis Downs cases and views
consensual releases as appropriate when, you know, adequate
disclosure is set forth. And that's the only reason I -- we
cited to that. I, in no way, was trying to insinuate that
Mr. Hackman should have done something different in these
cases or should have raised it at the disclosure statement or
otherwise. So I just wanted to clarify the record with
respect to that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. PACITTI: And I don't know if you wanted to hear a response or if you've heard enough, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, I would actually like to hear a response specifically with respect to the U.S. Trustee's argument regarding current and former employees recently.

MR. PACITTI: Sure, Your Honor. And I guess we

sort of view that as, you know, they're folks that are either creditors or on our mailing matrix, so they've gotten notice. The notice of confirmation hearing went to the entire mailing matrix, which includes all former and current employees. There's only a couple of employees currently, as it has been for months now.

So we view them in the same bucket as any other, you know, party-in-interest here who got notice, saw what was required in order to object to the conspicuously set forth, you know, plan provisions with respect to the releases. So we don't view that as any different, and that's the reason that we believe it's appropriate here.

THE COURT: Were employee claims satisfied in this case?

MR. PACITTI: They were, Your Honor. You know, everything pre-petition was paid. There was a first-day order, you know, paying, you know, anything that was accrued pre-petition that was a carryover. So we don't believe that there's many, if any, claims left.

And also, Your Honor, there's -- there was a bar date, obviously, that has gone past a long time ago. So, to the extent that there were any claims filed by employees, they would be on the matrix; they would be an unsecured creditor and would have gotten a ballot.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone else wish to be

heard with respect to confirmation of the plan?

(No verbal response)

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THE COURT: I do have one questions regarding the trust, the trust document. I want to make sure that I understand this correctly. Mr. Hackman, your position is that this provision -- if the Court were to limit exculpation, this provision has to correspondingly be revised. Is that correct?

MR. HACKMAN: Sorry, Your Honor. Can you hear me?
THE COURT: Yes, I can.

MR. HACKMAN: I'm sorry.

In the -- we submit that the provision in Section 7.2 of the liquidation trust agreement that would waive consequential, punitive, indirect, et cetera damages should be removed regardless of how -- of what the temporal extent of the exculpation is, in part because we believe that undermines the exceptions for gross negligence and wilful misconduct.

THE COURT: Mr. Pacitti, I didn't see where this was addressed in the debtors' brief. Could you address this argument, please --

MR. PACITTI: Yes.

THE COURT: -- or the trustee's argument?

MR. PACITTI: Your Honor, I think we viewed that provision that was objectionable as relating to the

limitation of liability provision above, so -- and I see now that there's a period, perhaps, that picks up. So I would - and again, I guess I would ask the committee if they would agree to this, as well, because they were involved in this hand in hand with us -- that, perhaps if we included the exception for fraud, gross negligence, and wilful misconduct that appears above as a lead-in to that sentence, that that might solve it. So, where it begins "in no event shall the trust," we say, "except for fraud, gross negligence or wilful misconduct," comment, "in no event shall the trust, trustee," blah, blah, blah, continue.

MS. LOTEMPIO: Your Honor, this is Catherine from Seward & Kissel on behalf of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. And we're in agreement with Mr. Pacitti on that. I think we discussed that yesterday.

THE COURT: Mister --

MS. LOTEMPIO: And that was our belief of the intent of the provision in the first instance.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hackman, would that resolve your issue with respect to that provision?

MR. HACKMAN: It helps, Your Honor, but we still sort of have a -- given that there is case law in the District that refers to this type of provision as an unreasonable term or provision of employment for a professional that is subject to the strict requirements of

the Bankruptcy Code, to -- for it to be available for a post-effective-date entity that's subject to significantly less court oversight, we don't think is an appropriate protection, it's -- for the liquidation trustee.

It's hard to know what is going to transpire over the coming months or years. And again, if the liquidation trustee wants to see exculpation at the end of the case, when it comes time to final decree the case, and make a showing that there — that there's a proper exception for wilful misconduct and gross negligence, I think the Court and the parties—in—interest could evaluate the request at that point. We submit that that would be the proper time for adjudicating exculpation and whatever liability there may or may not be for the administration of the trust then.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Does anyone else wish to be heard with respect to confirmation of the debtors' plan?

MS. LOTEMPIO: Your Honor, this is Catherine LoTempio from Seward & Kissel, again, on behalf of the official committee.

I just wanted -- I don't know if you want me to respond to the U.S. Trustee's point in the exculpation. In the trust agreement, I -- we just note that it's -- we believe it's limited and that it's appropriate for the trustee -- the liquidation trustee to have the protections of

an exculpation in performing its duties as a fiduciary under -- as a fiduciary to the estate and in the context. As long as it's acting within its duties, it should be protected and it should know, when it's performing its duties that it is entitled to those protections and has those protections, along with creditors or any other party-in-interest who's considering potentially filing something against the litigation [sic] trustee should know that the trustee has those protections. It's important to the operation of the liquidation trust. That's it, that's all I have. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Does anyone else wish to be heard with respect to confirmation of the plan?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: I have a few questions for the debtor.

One of the questions I have relates to the order itself. Paragraph 83 provides for extension of the trust.

And the reason I'm asking for this now is because it involves a plan provision, so I want to make sure that I understand this correctly. I'm not sure what this provision means.

Does this provision mean that the liquidation trust can ask the Court to extend the trust without IRS approval, or is it saying the Court can extend separate and apart from IRS approval? You know, I appreciate that there are IRS regulations for trusts and how to get them extended, and I'm

trying to figure out what exactly this provision means. 1 2 MR. PACITTI: I think it's giving you the authority 3 to extend it, Your Honor, and perhaps it's not as artfully 4 drafted as perhaps it should be. But if you read the second 5 sentence, it really talks about filing of a motion, and that 6 there's an extension pending approval of that motion. 7 believe that that was the import of this. So I don't think 8 that we're saying that you can abrogate the IRS's role. 9 THE COURT: Yeah, I just wanted --MR. PACITTI: I don't --10 11 THE COURT: You know --12 MR. PACITTI: -- think you can --13 THE COURT: -- if you're required --14 MR. PACITTI: -- do that. 15 THE COURT: -- to get a favorable letter ruling --MR. PACITTI: Right. 16 17 THE COURT: -- I am not abrogating the IRS rules. 18 MR. PACITTI: Right. 19 THE COURT: But if you're setting you get a bridge 20 order while you file or something like that, that's very 21 different.

MR. PACITTI: That's, I think, what the import of this section was meant to be, and we don't want to get the

IRS angry at any of us, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Me neither, so -- all right. Let me

just -- wait.

With respect to the proposed order, can the debtors address Paragraph -- never mind. I think that you've satisfied that. Sorry, I'm going through my notes here.

Oh, could you address, in Paragraph 1, the request for a waiver of the stay of the confirmation order?

MR. PACITTI: Your Honor, we don't -- we can -- we don't need that. Quite honestly, we're probably going to wait to -- for the appeal period to go effective, in any event. So, if you're suggesting that you have an issue with that, I don't have a problem with --

THE COURT: I just wanted to make a record.

MR. PACITTI: Yeah. I mean, Your Honor, we asked for it because we thought we'd go effective as soon as possible. Given there was an extant objection, depending on how Your Honor rules, there may be an appeal period. I don't know whether closing or going effective moves that or not. And given the Third Circuit's sort of discussions about mootness, who knows what happens then? So my inclination was to wait the appeal period, in any event.

THE COURT: Okay. So are you intending to strike that provision?

MR. PACITTI: If Your Honor is fine and if the committee is fine with that, we'd agree to it, to strike that, as well.

MS. LOTEMPIO: Fine with the committee, as long as 1 2 it's fine with the debtors. 3 THE COURT: Okay. All right. We're going to take a brief, five-minute break, and I'll come back and rule. 4 5 Okay? Thank you. 6 MR. PACITTI: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: We stand adjourned. 8 (Recess taken at 11:02 a.m.) 9 (Proceedings resume at 11:10 a.m.) THE COURT: Good afternoon. We are back on the 10 11 record in Furniture Factory Ultimate Holdings, L.P., Case 12 Number 20-12816. 13 This is the ruling on confirmation of the debtors' 14 plan. 15 First of all, I would really like to thank counsel 16 for the very helpful presentations today, as well as the very 17 thorough pleadings that you put before the Court on the 18 contested issues, it's very helpful. 19 I'm going to first address the U.S. Trustee's 20 objections to the plan. The U.S. Trustee is objecting to the 21 plan on the basis that it contemplates an improper or a non-22 consensual third-party release. This objection is overruled. 23 I find that the third-party releases are consensual because 24 creditors did have the opt -- ability to opt out of the plan

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release provisions.

The ballots contained language that was obvious and conspicuous regarding the optional release selection and set forth the text of the plan, Provision 9(d), including the definitions of "release" and "releasing parties." The ballot further advised, in making no affirmative election to opt out, the holder effectively releases all claims of the released parties.

In addition, the notice of confirmation hearing contained a text box explaining the opt out of the release and also set forth the deadline to object to the releases in the plan.

Section 1141 binds creditors to a plan, and creditors need to speak up and object to release provisions, just like they need to object to other plan provisions that they disagree with. Here, creditors did, in fact, speak up and not grant the releases. The tabulation declaration reflects, of the creditors voting, 18 out of 81 in Class 7 -- that's 22 percent -- opted out of the third-party releases.

For these reasons, I find the releases are consensual. I note this finding is consistent with the decisions in this district from the Indianapolis Downs line of cases.

Also and significantly, the debtors have added language in the confirmation order at Paragraph 86, providing that all holders of claims-in-interests whose solicitation

packages were undeliverable are deemed to opt out of the third-party releases. And because these third-party releases are consensual, the Court need not address the requirements for non-consensual releases.

The U.S. Trustee objects to the exculpation provision as overly broad, as it extends past the effective date. This objection is sustained.

First, exculpated parties are limited to estate fiduciaries in this district.

Second, I find that exculpation is limited to actions taken during the pendency of the cases and prior to the effective date. I will not prospectively exculpate actions taken following the effective date, nor will I expand exculpation to pre-petition acts. These actions are covered by releases.

And I believe that Mr. Hackman has made a good point, and that parties could -- the trustee could come forward at the end of the case in seeking a final decree, seeking exculpation. I make no judgment as to the validity of that, but it is a possibility.

So the definition of "exculpated claim" in 43 should be revised to replace "closing the Chapter 11 cases" with "effective date," and a corresponding change should be made to the trust agreement.

Based on the record of these Chapter 11 cases, the

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representations of the parties, and the record that has been made, including the rulings with respect to the U.S.

Trustee's objections, I will enter the order confirming the plan.

In terms of meeting the standards for confirmation, the debtors have admitted into evidence the declarations of Mr. Roach, which is uncontroverted and supports confirmation of the plan.

In addition, Ms. Tsai's declaration with respect to tabulation of votes explains the debtors have satisfied the provisions of 1126 for obtaining support of a plan.

The debtors filed a comprehensive memorandum of law in support of confirmation of the plan. And while the memorandum is not evidence, it is, nonetheless, part of the record before the Court. The memorandum lays out with specificity how the debtors have satisfied their various statutory burdens and requirements. The memorandum also addresses in detail the provisions of the plan, how the debtors are compliant with respect to 1129 and, to the extent applicable, 1123. I am satisfied, therefore, that the debtors have carried their burden under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code for confirmation of the plan.

MR. PACITTI: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I guess we'll revise the order. I'm trying to think if we should revise the plan, if that's

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easier, and just attach it to the order, but we can do it either way. I'll speak to the parties and we'll submit something under certification of counsel, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. PACITTI: I guess this can --THE COURT: And --MR. PACITTI: -- wait until tomorrow. THE COURT: And please, whatever you submit, could you make sure that you include a blackline --MR. PACITTI: Absolutely. THE COURT: -- and that Mr. Hackman and the United States Trustee and the committee are included in the discussions? MR. PACITTI: Absolutely, Your Honor. MS. LOTEMPIO: Your Honor, sorry. One point of clarification. On the exculpation in the liquidation trust agreement, is that to strike the provision in totality or can the parties agree to that? THE COURT: I would ask -- I was suggesting that you strike it in its totality, the provision starting with "in no event." MS. LOTEMPIO: Okay. Understood. MR. PACITTI: Understood. THE COURT: Are there any other questions? Do we have any other issues that we need to address today?

MR. PACITTI: I think that's it, Your Honor. 1 2 Just so Your Honor's chambers is aware, I don't 3 think we'll get anything to you today. So we'll reach out tomorrow, hopefully get it to you early in the day, and we'll 4 5 reach out to chambers to let you know that everything has been filed. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. MR. PACITTI: And we thank Your Honor --8 9 THE COURT: I --10 MR. PACITTI: -- and chambers. 11 THE COURT: I do have -- I am in tomorrow, I have a 12 meeting in the morning, but I am in the afternoon, and of 13 course, I'll be here Monday, as well. 14 MR. PACITTI: Great. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. PACITTI: Thank you so much, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 MR. PACITTI: Appreciate it. 19 THE COURT: Have a good day. We stand adjourned. 20 MR. HACKMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 (Proceedings concluded at 11:17 a.m.) **** 22

<u>CERTIFICATION</u>

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my knowledge and ability.

September 16, 2021

Coleen Rand, AAERT Cert. No. 341

Certified Court Transcriptionist

For Reliable